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During the C/S Verification Test (TP 2.368960) on the Array E Qualification 
Model, several changes of status occurred at turn-on, PC changeover or 
following other power interruptions. These discrepancies were documented 
in DR AC 5068, 5069, 5071, 5072., and 5082. 
This report documents the analysis of these anomalies, and discusses 
possible design changes to eliminate the discrepant operation. 
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1. 0 INTRODUCTION 
The Array E Qualification Model Discrepancy Reports which 
are listed as References #1 through f 5 detail spurious changes of status 
which occurred at turn-on, PC changeover or following other power 
3 
supply interruptions. The first three are the result of the same critical V cc 
mechanism which caused Qualification Model relay scrambling, and which 
is fully described i1n ATM-1087 (Reference #6). The last two,Refs.f4 and :/15, 
are caused by unusually high reverse leakage currents into the command 
output gates. 
Where PDU relay scrambling is involved the system could be 
left in a locked-out condition, but in the case of flip-flop status changes it 
is always possible to regain the desired status by command. 
This ATM discusses each DR in turn and then considers possible 
ways of eliminating the problems. As in the case of the turn-on relay 
scrambling, (Reference f 6), it is not possible because of program impact 
to remove the basic cause of the anomalies by fairly simple design changes. 
The only practical approach is to attempt to block some or all of the un-
desired effects by additional circuits incorporated into the harness, with 
the main emphases upon acceptable operation during an unmonitored auto-
matic PC switchover, and the maintenance of stable relay status at all times. 
2.0 DR AC 5068: CHANGE FROM DP FORMATTING TO LSPE 
FORMATTING FOLLOWING OCTAL COMMAND 110 
Figure 1 shows the uplink +5 volt switching circuit. The relay 
which Command 110 controls selects redundant power routes to the main 
Select Uplink A/Select Uplink B relays, the redundant routes being 
necessary to prevent a possible single point failure mechanistn in the 
main relays. Normally theW /X relay will be flown in theW position and 
will remain there for the whole mission. If an automatic uplink switch 
does take place, then theW /X relays and the Uplink A /B relay will change 
simultaneously. Only then will it be necessary to consider transmitting 
Octal Command 110 with the intention of causing an actual relay changeover, 
back to the original position. (An Octal 110 command may be transmitted 
immediately after station turn-on in order to ensure that the W /X relay 
really is in the W position. However, since no magnetically latched relay 
has so far changed position due to mechanical causes, and since telemetry 
channel HK 26 indicates the position of this relay, it is unlikely that Command 
110 will need to be transmitted. Even if it is, the only result should be a CVW, 
with no change of status). 
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The typical effect of the X/W relay changeover is shown in 
Figure 2.. The +5 Volts is switched from one redundant power route to 
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the other, and while the relay is in transition the Uplink, and in particular 
the Command Decoder, is effectively unpowered. The individual PC board 
decoupling capacitors in the Decoder will discharge very rapidly, and it is 
quite possible that the +5 Volt V c:.c line will drop below the critical level. 
Once the V cc has dropped below 1. 5 Volt to 2.. 5 Volt, depending upon temper-
ature, the subsequent recovery state of any flip-flop will be indeterminate, 
unless reset by some external input. This lack of memory in symmetrical 
flip-flops following loss of power is not peculiar to Array E, but in this case 
it is accentuated by the inability of the TTL 54L gates to function correctly 
once the V cc is below the relatively high critical level. (See Reference #6). 
During a normal turn-on, or an Uplink changeover, the Decoder power -
reset circuits will operate to initialize all flip-flops in predetermined states; 
in the case of Cmd 110 the power interruption is too short to trigger the power 
resets. 
Although only a DP to LSPE formatting change has been observed 
so far, any of the following spurious operations are theoretically possible: -
a) DP Formatting to LSPE Formatting, or vice versa. 
b) Periodic Command Inhibit to Periodic Commands Enable, 
or vice versa. 
c) Random setting of the Command Decoder sequencing logic 
flip-flops, mode sequence counter, and command register, 
such that one or more spurious commands may be issued. 
The commands may range from one of 2.1 milliseconds, with 
CVW, indistinguishable from a normal command, to approximately ten 
1 millisecond commands, with or without a single CVW. Alternatively 
a CVW may be received with no corresponding change of status, or the 
Decoder may temporarily lock itself out, requiring a modulation or 
carrier break to restore control. It should be noted that for these events 
to occur several flip-flops must change states into specific combinations, 
and the overall probability is fairly low. 
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There are four ways in which this problem could be overcome: -
a) Modify the power r•set circuits so that they will respond 
to any voltage reduction, however short, which drops the 
V c line below the critical V cc level. This would be the pr~ferred method, if the impact of its practical implemen-
tation in Array E were not completely prohibitive. 
b) Bias the turn-on state of every flip-flop in the Command 
Decoder with capacitors. This method would be simple 
and effective, but it involves internal modifications and 
additional parts inside the Decoder. 
c) Deliberately lengthen the interruption to the +5 Volt 
Uplink supply, so that the internal Decoder power reset 
circuits will be triggered. This requires the design and 
construction of a special switch, to be inserted in the PDU I 
Decoder harness leads. (See Reference #7) 
d) Hold up the Command Decoder +5 Volt line with storage 
capacitors during the power interruption. Only a few 
microfarads would be necessary, but because of possible 
undesirable side effects this approach is not favored. 
Previous tests have shown that , in curing one problem 
with similar capacitors, spurious commands were produced 
due to the much slower V cc run-down at Uplink changeover. 
The capacitor value is critical, if indeed there is one value 
which is satisfactory in all respects. 
A fifth possibility is to do nothing, based on the following 
a) The transmission of Cmd 110 following an automatic Uplink 
switch is not absolutely essential for continued operation. 
If the original loss of Uplink was due to a failure in the 
primary power routing itself, then Cmd 110 would produce 
a further temporary loss of Uplink, until the next auto-switch. 
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However, since we are concerned here mainly with the 
mechanical failure of a relay, or the shaking of contam-
inant particles across contacts which are normally never 
disturbed during the mission, it may be argued that once 
the system is deployed and is mechanically quiet, then 
the probability of power routing failure is extremely small. 
If thie failure mode does not o-ccur at deployment, it 
probably never will. Any subsequent Uplink loss will most 
likely be due to an electronic failure, and Command 110 
is irrelevant in that context. 
b) Whatever undesirable status changes may occur following 
Cmd 110, they can be quickly corrected, since Cmd llO can 
be sent only during real-time coverage. 
DR AC 5069: APM CAME UP IN "OFF" STATE AT TURN -ON 
(HK-76) 
This has been conclusively shown to be caused by a 0.1 
millisecond spurioue command from the Command Decoder during turn-
on. Although a rels;y would not respond to such a short pulse, (and all 
6 
PDU relays are in any case protected by the new +5 Volt (Z) switch), it is 
far in excess of what is required to toggle a flip-flop. Figure 3 shows the 
relevant circuit details. Although the flip-flop does have aRC power-reset 
circuit, it has a very short time constant ( """-' 1 millisecond) and it can do 
nothing to overcome the effect of a spurious command which occurs several 
milliseconds after the applix:ation of power to the PCU. The only guaranteed 
solution in this particular case would be a much improved power-reset 
circuit. Even if the spurious command from the Decoder was completely 
eliminated, the PCU inverters 3) and 4), and 5) and 6) in Figure 3 are 
potentially capable of generating spurious commands themselves, although 
it is possible that in this case they would be swamped by the effect of the 
existing RC power reset circuit. 
The problem of eliminating all spurious commands from the 
decoder will be considered later. Assuming for the moment that spurious 
commands to the PCU will continue to be a possibility, the most likely 
response is the APM status change already observed; it could theoretically 
occur at initial turn-on or during a PC changeover. Changes of status of 
the PC Select and PC Autoswitch Select relays are also theoretically possible, 
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but circuit analysis in the light of typical operation has shown that the 
probability is extremely low. (Note that the PCU relays are internally 
powered and are not protected by the +5 Volt (Z) switch). 
Incorrect APM status at turn-on is easily corrected by 
immediate command, but incorrect APM status following an automatic 
PC changeover might lead to all reserve power being dumped internally 
during the lunar day. This could be tolerated for some time, but it would 
eventually become highly desirable to command the APM "On". 
The +5 voit capacitive hold-up circuit discussed in Section 7. 4a, 
P8.ge 13, provides an effective preventative measure in the case of an automatic 
PCU switch-over resulting from regulator failure in which an overvoltage 
transient occurs. In this case the switching circuit will operate to transfer 
PCU' s within 5 milliseconds and the 5 volt line will hold up during the 
8\Vitchover. In the case of an automatic low -voltage switchover, however, the 
auto-switch circuit delayf!l for 300 milliseconds before responding, and in a 
genuine failure conditioa, there is no limit to the 5V line voltage drop. 
The normal operational rule will be to leave the APM enabled 
,at all times, and it is possible to produce a fairly strong rationale for 
locking the APM command flip-flop into the "Enable" state, and eliminating 
the APM commands. 
If an automatic PC changeover should occur, the duration of 
the automatic command is such that it will over-ride any spurious commands 
which try to prevent it. 
4.0 DR AC 5071: UPLINK SWITCH DELAY STATUS CHANGED TO 
"DELAYED" AT PC CHANGEOVER (HK-01) 
This circuit is powered from the +5 Volt (Z) line. The most 
probable explanation is that during the PC changeover the +5 Volt line 
dropped close to or below the critical level, causing the 5 Volt (Z) 
switch to cut off the supply to the flip-flop for a period which was not 
long enough to trigger the power reset. When the power was re-applied 
the Uplink Switch Delay/Enable flip-flop came up in an indeterminate 
condition. Even without the +5 Volt (Z) switch, a sufficiently deep drop 
in the +5 Volt supply could cause a similar effect; the +5 Volt (Z) switch 
simply increases the probability. 
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Although not observed, similar changes of status could occur in 
the Uplink Switch routing flip-flop, the timing (counter) circuit and the Ripple 
Off counter. 
The possible methods of prevention are similar to those discussed 
in Section 2. 0 above, (Page 3), with the following qualifications: 
5.0 
a) Modified power-reset. As in Section 2a, Page 4. Preferred 
method. 
b) Capacitive bias. As in Section 2b, Page 4. 
c) Lengthening the interruption to the +5 volt supply would be 
effective, but in this case the switch would have to be in the 
+5 volt (Z) line. It would be in effect a much more compli-
cated version of the existing +5 volt ( Z) delay module. 
d) Ca.pacitive hold-up of the +5volt supply is in this case a non-
critical, acceptable solution, provided that the capacitance is 
large enough. The capacitor could be at the PCU /PDU inter-
face, or at the +5 volt (Z) output, the latter requiring the 
lower total value. To cover the case of a low-voltage auto-
switch, the +5 volt (Z) line capacitance should be at least 
3000 ...-'<'F. 
DR AC 5072. EXPERIMENT #2 CHANGED FROM "STANDBY" 
TO "OFF" AT PC CHANGEOVER (HK-12) 
This occurred only once, and could not be made to recur during 
several subsequent PC changes. It was established that the redundant side 
of the PDU had remained in the "Standby" state and that both sides of the PDU 
tracked correctly from then on. It was not possible to determine exactly 
when the change had occurred (it could have preceded the PC switch), nor, with 
any certainty, what the cause might be. Noting that the circuit affected was 
fairly sensitive and that it drove a rapidly responding Teledyne relay, it was 
suggested that a short spurious command or power glitch was just able to 
affect one relay without being sufficient to drive any of the other three. If the 
reason was a spurious command, then it implied that the +5 Volt (Z) switch 
was not cutting off rapidly enough as the supply fell, in which case a possible 
solution was to reduce the +5 Volt (Z) fall time, once the switch had cut off, 
by removing the extra capacitors in the new module, leaving only the original 
0. 34 microfarad of the existing PDU Circuit. (Currently the total capacitance 
.r-~~ 
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across the +5 volt (Z) output line is 1. 02 microfarads.) However, oscilloscope 
photographs of the Uplink +5 volt switched supply and the +5 volt (Z) supply did 
not support this idea, but these photographs were taken some time after the 
anomaly had become apparent. 
Following further spurious changes of Experiment #2 status during 
subsequent test operations, the true cause was found to be a current leakage in 
the command line. The investigation is described in Section 6. 0 below. 
6.0 DR AC5082. EXPERIMENT 12 CHANGED SPONTANEOUSLY 
FROM "ON" TO "STAND BY'~ AND FROM "STAND BY" TO "OFF". 
When the Qual model Central Station was in Uplink A and PC #2, 
the Experiment f2 power status several times changed spontaneously from 
"ON" to "STANDBY", and from "STANDBY" to "OFF". The periods before 
the changes occurred varied from several minutes down to apparently zero. 
As the temperature fell from about 125°F to room temperature, the "ON" to 
"STANDBY" spontaneous change ceased, and the "STANDBY" to "OFF" change 
occurred less frequently. The relays appeared to respond correctly to all 
commands, even if the spurious drive then set them immediately to another 
condition. When PC #1 and/or Uplink B was selected there was apparently no 
anomalous behavior, and it was found that whichever PC/Uplink combination 
was selected, the Experiment #2 relays in PDU #1 always tracked the commands 
correctly, inrespective of the behavior of the relays in PDU #2. 
In order to localize the fault more precisely, the voltages on the 
harness command lines to the relay drivers were measured. The typical value 
on an experiment command line was 4. 7 volts, but with Uplink A operating the 
"Experiment #2 OFF" line showed only 4. 2 volts. (See Figure 5) When the 
current in this commaad line was measured, it was found to be about 10 micro-
amps into the logical '1' output of the TTL 54L gate, compared with only some 
tens of nanoamps on the other command lines. When Uplink B was selected. 
the "Experiment f2 OFF" command line showed no anomaly. 
The final tests at system level were to note the command line 
behavior with both Uplinks powered and with both Uplinks unpowered. Summar-
izing all results: 
A ON A OFF 
B ON No anomaly No anomaly 
B OFF Anomaly Anomaly I 
It was clear that the anomaly occurred only if Uplink B was "OFF"; 
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the state of Uplink A had no effect. The problem therefore appeared to lie 
inside the "Experiment #2 OFF" command gate, in the 1B 1 side of the Command 
Decoder. 
Tests at card level consisted of connecting the outputs of the 
unpowered command gates to +5 volts, through a 50, 000 ohm resistor, and 
measuring the leakage current at various temperatures. Starting at approxi-
mately 200 nanoamps at room temperature, the leakage current into the suspect 
gate increased with temperature, approximately doubling every 10 degrees 
Centigrade, until at l!OOF - 120°F several microamps were flowing. The 
remaining "good" gates showed leakage currents which followed the same 
doubling law, but which were at least one order smaller. 
Having definitely traced the cause of the problem to the command 
gate, the relevant chip was replaced. Further investigations into the reasons 
for the unusually high leakage current are still in progress, and will be reported 
separately. It is relevant to note at this point that reverse leakage into the 
logical 'I' output of a powered or unpowered TTL 54L gate is not a parameter 
which the manufacturer formally tests or specifies, nor, it appears, has any 
knowledge of. In the early stages of the PDU design it was realized that such 
leakage could be a potential problem, and initial proposals incorporated base-
emitter resistors, as in the current PDM dump drivers, in order to desensitize 
the system, However, low measured leakage currents, and reliability parts-
count trades off, led to their removal. 
When the relay scrambling problem occurred (See Reference #6), 
the immediate line of attack was "gate leakage", but despite all attempts to 
induce leakage this approach had to be abandoned. The current problem is the 
first practical evidence of the "fault", which was searched for, and not found, 
in at least three earlier series of tests. 
Since we do not yet know the mechanism which causes the leakage, 
it is not possible to say whether screening all gates and rejecting those giving 
more than, say, lA A at any temperature would be sufficient to eliminate any 
future recurrence of the problem. The leakage may be subject to an aging 
process, or it may be mechanical deformation susceptible to the expansions and 
contractions of successive temperature cycles, or it may be simply an unchang-
ing manufacturing problem, etc. - there is not sufficient evidence so far to draw 
any statistically significant conclusions. The only hopeful evidence available at 
the moment is that in testing about 150 gates for reverse leakage it was found 
,"•a•azaoe 
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that the "good" and the "unacceptable" groups are fairly distinct, i.e., the 
"unnacceptables" are not simply the arbitrarily separated tail-end of an 
overall normal distribution. This suggests that there is a definite physical 
difference and that it is probably not an ageing effect. If all the gates are in 
reality from one continuous population it is difficult to explain why there are 
roughly 3% - 5% "unnacceptables" when their position at about ten sigma from 
the mean gives their probability of occurrence as considerably less than 1-in-
1012. 
Assuming that permanent elimination of high leakage currents by 
selection cannot be guaranteed, the ideal solution would be to modify the 
IIV. MO. 
or 
designs of the PDU relay drivers so as to make them compatible with the spec-
ified logic 111 and logic 10 1 voltage levels of the TTL 54L gates, when the problem 
of leakage effects would automatically disappear. This is clearly impractible 
because of the program impact. A less elegant, but a simple and effective 
expedient is to add a 5 Kilohm pull-up resistor from the +5 volt (Z) line to each 
susceptible command line. 
Two aspects of the anomaly which remain to be explained are why 
only the PDU #2 relays were affected, and why the spurious change to "OFF" 
occasionally delayed for a considerable time at the "STANDBY 11 stage. The 
relay driver performance charts in BxA Memo 9713-530 (Reference #8) show 
that there is a common reason. 
The normal ranges of parameter variations for the driver transistors 
are quite wide, and the required switching input current from the TTL 54L gate 
may vary by a ratio of at least 6 to 1. At a leakage current of 10 microamps the 
probability of switching is very roughly 200ft. Hence, with two randomly selected 
relay drivers connected in parallel to the same command line it is not surprising 
that one of the two never responded to the spurious input. .At half the leakage 
current probably neither would switch; at five times the leakage current both would 
switch. It was simply chance that gave a leakage current in the "may switch/ 
will not switch" transition region. Extending this argument to individual relays, 
rather than relay drivers, explains why the transitions to"OFF" occasionally 
lingered in "STANDBY". The "ON" to "STANDBY"or"OFF" change is a function 
of the Potter-Brumfield relay, while the selection of "STANDBY" or "OFF", 
once the system is not "ON", is determined by the separate Teledyne relay. If 
one assumes that the P. B. relay is at the more sensitive end of the specified 
characteristics, and that the Teledyne relay is at the less sensitive end, and 
also that the temperature and/or leakage current is slowly changing, it is easy to 
see that in marginal switching conditions the relays will almost certainly not 
change simultaneously. Variations of this theme, assuming differing temperature 
gradients and variations of relay resistance with temperature, can explain all the 
observed behavior. 
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7.0 GENERAL DISCUSSION. 
7. 1 If the impacts upon the program were not completely unnacceptable, 
it would be possible to eliminate with lOOo/o certainty every anomaly discussed 
above, and all other spurious commands and Central Station status changes, by 
the following three design modifications: 
a) Supply each command output gate with a V cc which is always 
at least 200 millivolts lower than the V cc to any other gate 
in ~e Command Decoder. In particular, this difference must 
be maintained over the 1. 5 volt to 2. 5 volt V cc range, what-
ever the direction and rate of change of voltage. This modifi-
cation would eliminate all spurious commands due to the critical 
V cc level mechanism. 
b) Change all power reset circuits so that they generate a 
100 millisecond pulse whenever the +5 volt supply line 
returns from below 2. 75-3.00 volts, with no minimum 
requirement for the duration of the power supply "glitch". 
This would ensure that all flip-flops would be set to accept-
able, predetermined conditions in the event of a major power 
"disturbance which took the V cc below the critical level. 
c) Reduce the V cc of the input stages of all relay drivers to 
about 3 volts, with appropriate driver circuit resistor 
value changes. This would make the drivers compatible 
with the manufacturer's specified performance of the TTL 
54L gate, irrespective of any tendency to generate reverse 
leakage currents. 
7. 2 In addition to the above it would also be desirable, if program 
impact permitted, to modify the PCU regulator loop gain to give a rapid rise 
to full output voltage at turn-on, eliminating the existing 10 to 15 millisecond 
plateau at the critical 2. 0 to 2. 5 volt level. (See Figure 5 of Reference #6) 
This plateau was originally attributed to the action of the APM circuit, but a 
recent analysis has shown that it is primarily due to a Miller integrator action 
in the third stage of the regulator feedback amplifier. The APM, input power, 
and output load contribute only in determining the level at which the saturation 
plateau occurs; under normal turn-on conditions the plateau occurs at or near 
the critical V cc level. Since all the outputs, including the +29 volt lines, follow 
the same waveform, a more rapid rise would be beneficial in preventing experi-
ment status changes during PC changeover due to power reset-circuits. It is 
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known that such changes have occurred in HFE and that they could theo-
retically occur in at least the LSG experiment. Within the Central Station, 
the previously suggested power reset modifications would prevent random 
status changes at a PC changeover, but it would be preferable if the supply 
voltages never had an opportunity to drop to the critical level. 
The above remarks, of course, apply mainly to a commanded 
PC changeover, or an automatic over-voltage changeover. In the case of 
an automatic under-voltage changeover, due to a heavy and sustained over-
load or a regulator failure, it is impossible to guarantee that the voltages 
will not drop to the power-reset level during the 300 millisecond delay 
period. In any case, a severe overload would probably cause all experi-
ments to be rippled to "STANDBY" before the PC change could occur. 
7. 3 The changes discussed above constitute the only 100% satis-
factory solutions, and they are the only changes which would attack the root 
causes of the anomalies. All the other "fixes" which have been discussed, 
and which will be discussed below, are attacks upon the symptoms only, 
and complete success cannot be guaranteed. 
7. 4 The earlier sections discussed specific anomalies and specific 
solutions. The following paragraphs outline other system modifications, 
which may be acceptable from a program impact-point of view and which 
mask as many symptoms as possible. 
In discussing spurious commands, flip-flop status changes and 
relay scrambling, it must be remembered that only relay scrambling could 
place the system in an irrecoverable, failed situation. The +5 volt (Z) 
switch, discussed in Reference #6 appears to solve satisfactorily the turn-
on relay-scrambling problem, making less than perfect solutions for the 
other problems acceptable. 
" Possible approaches are as follows: 
a) Hold up the +5 volt supply from the PCU to the PDU with 
capacitors during a PC changeover, such that the +5 volt 
(Z) switch does not operate, nor do any gate V cc fall to 
the critical level. Figure #4 shows the proposed circuit. 
Because of the limited availability of capacitors it would 
be necessary to restrict the hold-up circuit to the PC #1 
to PDU #1 +5 volt line. The very large capacitance value 
leads to a noticeable weight penalty, of about 0. 7 lbs per 
capacitor module. 
This circuit eliminates only those Central Station problems 
which occur during a normal 35 millisecond PC changeover 
ltiY, MO. 
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transient. It does not in any way affect a turn-on problem, 
such as APM status, nor the effects of Command 110. There 
will also be no protection if the power supply is lost for 
appreciably longer than 35 milliseconds. The +5 volt (Z) 
switch must be retained for protection from relay scrambling 
at initial turn-on. 
b) Place voltage-sensitive relay switches in the +5 volt supply 
line to each half of the Command Decoder, and a 3, OOOJ'f F 
hold-up circuit on the +5 volt (Z) line. The switches would 
detect when the +5 volt lines dropped below about +3 volts and 
would then cut off the supply to the Decoder very rapidly, using 
a transistor "crowbar" to discharge any capacitors. Follow-
ing a switch-of£, there would be a delay of at least 100 milli-
seconds after the input voltage had risen above +3 volts before 
the series relay would reconnect the supply to the Command 
Decoder, for a rapid rise throught the critical level. The 
100 mS delay would ensure that the Decoder power-reset circuits 
woudl be triggered. The full requirements, design rationale and 
circuit details for the switch are given in Memo 9713-560 (Ref-
erence 17). The switches would not prevent spurious commands 
from occurrilal, 
but they would ensure that the rise and fall of the V cc 
through the critical region would be so rapid that any spurious 
commands would be extremely short, probably much less than a 
microsecond, and the probability of effecting any status changes 
would be very small. The hold-up circuit on the +5 volt (Z) 
line would ensure that during a normal PC changeover the voltage 
level would not drop low enough to take any of the associated flip-
flops into the critical region. These fixes in compination should 
give a high probability of preventing any of the observed or theo-
retically possible critical level anomalies from occurring. 
c) Insert two series gates in each command line, (or at least in 
each critical command line), the first gate being supplied from 
the +5 volt switched supply to the Command Decoder, the 
second through a constant 200 millivolt drop from the same 
supply. These would prevent any spurious commands at turn-
on or at PC changeover, but would have no effect upon spurious 
flip-flop changes of status due to low V cc· 
MO. RIY. MO. 
ol > 
~ ATM-1096 
Spurious Status Changes in Array E 
PAGI 15 0' 
DATI 
8.0 SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The basic causes of all the observed and theoretically possible 
anomalies (except experiment power resets at PC changeover) are the re-
latively high critical level of the TTL 54L gates, and the occasional unusu-
ally high v:alue of the unspecified reverse leakage current. The insensi-
tivity of the power-reset circuits to short "glitches" and the slow rise of the 
PCU outputs contribute to the final anomalous behavior, or allow it to occur. 
A 100, guaranteed "fix" program is theoretically possible, but it cannot be 
implemented because of the general impact. Various partial fixes of the 
symptoms have been discussed, and of these the best practical compromise would 
be: 
a) Voltage-sensitive switch in each +5 volt lead to the. Command 
Decoder, plus a 3, 000 fiF capacitor hold-up on the +5 volt (Z) 
line. 
b) Screening of all relay command gates to eliminate high reverse 
leakage, plus the possible addition of 5 Kohm pull-up resistors 
on all critical command lines, this latter only being necessary 
if the nature of the leakage mechanism and its assumed long-
term stability cannot be demonstrated. 
At present, the only corrective measures which have been implemented are 
reverse leakage screening, plus a 5, 400 ~ F hold-up circuit on the PCU # 1 to 
PDU #11 +5 volt line (See Paragraph 7. 4 a)). 
MO. 
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Addendum to Section 6. 0 
Late Information - The latest information on the gate reverse leakage 
problem is that examination of the "faulty" gate has shown that its high 
leakage is caused by a manufacturing anomaly, and that there is no reason 
to believe that the low leakage of acceptable gates will drift up to un-
acceptable levels within the intended life of Array E. This information 
is in agreement with the tentative conclusions which were drawn in Sec-
tion 6. 0 from the simple analysis of the grouping of the "faulty" and 
"acceptable" leakage current results. 
IIY. MO. 
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DR AC5072 - Experiment #2 changed from "Standby" to "Off" 
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